Specification and Verification of High-Level Properties

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December 6th, 2018

Frama-C

A verification *framework* for C programs

- A specification language: ACSL
- A kernel to parse C and ACSL
- A large collection of collaborative plugins



Software Analyzers

ACSL is a contract-oriented specification language. *Example*: The contract of a function testing if an array T of with size elements contains x

```
/*@
  requires \valid_read(T + (0..(size - 1)));
  ensures \result == 0 <==> \forall integer j;
    0 <= j < size ==> T[j] != x;
  assigns \nothing \from size, x, *(T + 0 .. (size - 1));
*/
int is_member(int* T, unsigned size, int x) { ... }
```

WP and deductive verification


- Brings formal guarantees when tests only increase trust
- Sound but incomplete



The Limits of ACSL: a Case Study

Confidentiality-oriented page management:

- Each page has a confidentiality level CL (PUBLIC or PRIVATE),
- Each process has a similar level,
- A process can read from (or write to) a page depending on their levels
- A process may encrypt/decrypt a page, thus changing its level



Function contracts are insufficient: need for more global properties

We introduce meta-properties, which are a combination of:

- A classic property *P*, expressed in ACSL.
- A context: The specific situation in which *P* must hold inside a function.
- **Target functions:** The set of functions for which *P* should hold in the given context.

meta \strong_invariant({foo,bar}), A < B; "A < B" must hold everywhere in functions foo and bar meta \writing(ALL), \written != &X; No function can modify the global variable X meta \writing(ALL), \written == &X ==> X == 0; A function can only modify X if it was previously null

- Strong invariant: Everywhere in the function
- Weak invariant: Before and after the function
- **Upon writing:** Whenever the memory is modified. The property *P* can use a special meta-variable \written, referencing the address being written to at a particular point.

meta \writing(ALL), \written != &X; No function can modify the global variable X

- Upon reading: Similarly, when memory is read
- Upon calling: Similarly, when a function is called

In Frama-C, predicates can refer to the value of locations at different points (labels): *Pre, Post, Here*, C labels, etc.

```
assert \at(x, Here) == \at(x, Pre);
```

 ${\bf x}$ has the same value as when the function was called

Still true for meta-properties with two more labels: *Before* (resp. *After*), referring to state before (resp. after) any statement relevant to the context.

```
meta \writing(main), \written != &X ||
\at(X, Before) == 0 || \at(X, After) != 0;
There is no statement changing X to 0 in main
```

Automatic Verification of Meta-properties (1/4)

Translation of meta-properties into native ACSL: leverage existing tools. **Strong invariant** P: assert P when truth may change

Before and after transformation for meta \strong_invariant(main), A == B; A must remain equal to B at every point of main

void main() {
 C = 42;
 A = C;
 B = C;
 S
}

```
/*@ requires A == B;
1
       ensures A == B;
2
   */
3
   void main() {
4
       C = 42;
5
       A = C:
6
7 //@ assert A == B; //Failure
8
       B = C:
       //@ assert A == B;
9
   }
10
```

lenient delimiter:

- Combines strong and weak invarant
- Allows to break the invariant locally

Virgile Robles (CEA List, LSL)

Automatic Verification of Meta-properties (2/4)

Upon writing: detect modification sites by syntactic analysis

```
Before and after transformation for
meta \writing(main), \written != &C;
main cannot modify C
```

		<pre>void main() {</pre>
	<pre>void main() {</pre>	2 //@ assert &C != &C //Failure
2 C 3 A		$_{3}$ C = 42;
	$ \begin{array}{l} A &= C; \\ B &= C; \end{array} $	4 //@ assert &A != &C
		$5 \qquad A = C;$
$\frac{4}{5}$ }		6 //@ assert &B != &C
5 J		7 B = C;
		8 }

Performance: discard any obvious assertion to avoid overloading the proof

Automatic Verification of Meta-properties (3/4)


After/Before labels: refer to local C labels

```
Before and after transformation for

meta \writing(main), \written != &X ||

\at(X, Before) == 0 || \at(X, After) != 0;

There is no statement changing X to 0 in main
```



Automatic Verification of Meta-properties (4/4)

Specification-only functions: use assigns clause for writing context

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

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18

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```
/*@
1
         behavior BA:
2
           assumes PA(params);
3
           assigns XA1, XA2;
4
         behavior BB:
\mathbf{5}
           assumes PB(params);
6
           assigns XB;
7
    */
8
    extern void g(params);
9
10
    void f() {
11
         g(act_params);
12
    }
13
14
    /*@ meta \writing(f),
15
         \written != &glob;
16
    */
17
```

```
/*@
    behavior BA:
      assumes PA(params);
      assigns XA1, XA2;
    behavior BB:
      assumes PB(params);
      assigns XB:
*/
extern void g(params);
void f() {
    g(act_params);
    /*@ assert PA(act parms)
         \Rightarrow &XA1 != &glob; */
    /*@ assert PA(act parms)
         \Rightarrow &XA2 != &glob; */
    /*@ assert PB(act_parms)
         \Rightarrow &XB != &glob; */
}
```

Back to the Confidentiality Case Study

- The confidentiality case study was:
 - Implemented in C
 - Partially specified with ACSL contracts
 - Fully specified with meta-properties

Some of the meta-properties:

- Public allocated pages cannot be modified by private agents
- Confidentiality levels can only be modified by encryption/decryption
- Unallocated pages cannot be read from
- Only the allocation/deallocation functions can change the status of a page


Verification results:

- Transformation time: < 5s
- 290 proof obligations
- ullet Automatically proved in $\approx 1 m$ with Alt-Ergo

Conclusion

Contributions:

- More expressive power: see case study
- High-level view of properties established on a software module
- Ease development: automatically check if a property is maintained after an update (of the code or of a function contract)



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For more details, see:

- *MetAcsl: Specification and Verification of High-Level Properties*, (submitted for TACAS 2019, arXiv:1811.10509)
- https://github.com/Firobe/metacsl_examples